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INTRODUCTION
This Essay is an effort to construct a normative basis for a constitu-
tional theory to resist the Supreme Court's recent decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.' In DeShaney, the
Court decided that a local social service worker's failure to prevent child
abuse did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
even though the social worker "had reason to believe" the abuse was
occurring. 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court held that
government inaction cannot violate due process unless the state has cus-
tody of the victim, 3 thus settling a controversial constitutional issue.
This decision should be resisted because it tends to keep power from the
powerless and preserves political power in the hands of the few.
The glaring failures of the DeShaney opinion invite attack. Formal-
istic and unambitious in its examination of history, the opinion reaches
out to decide the broadest constitutional issue presented.4 Most seri-
ously, on the level of judicial craftsmanship, the opinion fails to engage in
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1. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2. I. at 191.
3. The Court acknowledged that the state owes affirmative duties to people in state custody
and suggested that it also might owe affirmative duties to come to the aid of children placed by the
state in foster care or others whose plight was caused or aggravated by state action. See id at 198-
201, 198 n.5, 200 n.8, 201 n.9.
4. The Court declined to reach the non-constitutional issues of whether the defendants were
immune and whether the standard for county liability was met; it also declined to reach the constitu-
tional issue of whether the state officials had the state of mind necessary to support a due process
claim. See id at 202 n.10.
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an in-depth discussion of the controversial constitutionals and ethical is-
sues.6 But resolved to resist the temptation of attacking the easy targets,
I focus instead on substantive objections to the theory that underlies
DeShaney.
The ethical problems of the decision correspond to issues concerning
the origins of and remedies for administrative failure. The increasing
role of administrators in our society has led to escalating levels of agency
failure. Further, increased dependence on agency action increases the
consequences of agency failure and thus makes judicial review all the
more important. If agency actions are to remain consistent with norma-
tive views that inform both the fourteenth amendment and the civil
rights statutes, the federal judiciary should intervene when local adminis-
trative failure results in injury.
DeShaney involved a helpless child injured both by his father, the
person to whom society entrusted him for care and protection, and a
social worker who exhibited incompetence and indifference to the child's
welfare. This sort of situation presents a particularly strong example of
the need for judicial intervention-it calls out for a new doctrinal picture
of state and local government responsibility to protect individuals like
Joshua DeShaney from private violence. But my purpose is not to pro-
vide a definitive legal argument. Rather, I want to raise the possibility
that the distinction between action and inaction, upon which the Court
relied, does not settle the issue. Instead, I believe that a solution to the
problem depends on a thorough understanding of the morality of govern-
ment inaction and the role of government institutions in our society.
The development of a coherent normative structure to analyze
problems like administrative failure is hampered by the Court's unwill-
ingness to focus on systematic questions regarding compensation for
state-inflicted injuries. 7 A central theme in the Court's recent due pro-
5. In disposing of the claim that the state's failure to prevent the child abuse violated substan-
tive due process, the Court failed to analyze the issue under traditional substantive due process
doctrine regarding the outrageousness, reasonableness, or acceptability to society of the challenged
conduct. The Court avoided the question of the propriety of the state conduct by categorizing it as
inaction and holding that inaction in this context could not violate the due process clause. See id. at
194-203. It is impossible to be more precise about this. The Court's opinion does not specify
whether its reasoning entails a finding of no deprivation or a finding of no due process problem with
a deprivation. See id.
6. Two issues that deserved serious attention were the extent of government's responsibility to
care for helpless members of society, and the morality of government standing by while one member
of society does violence to another. The Court avoided consideration of these central issues.
7. As I have argued elsewhere, in holding that state official torts do not violate the Constitu-
tion, the Court fails to investigate the treatment by the state of its tort victims generally. "Govern-
ment official torts would not look trivial or unimportant if the Court focused on the state's refusal to
compensate rather than on the official's tortious conduct." Jack Beermann, Government Official
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cess jurisprudence is that state law-based tort actions should not be con-
verted into due process violations merely because state officials
committed the tort.8 The Court adheres rigidly to this theme and ap-
pears uninterested in the question of whether compensation is available
from state officials for conduct that would generate liability for non-gov-
ernmental defendants.9 Plaintiffs will continue to bring claims like the
one in DeShaney to federal court to avoid state immunities or limits on
tort recovery, and the Court should decide whether the immunities and
limits imposed by the state are constitutional.
In developing this normative position I proceed as follows. First, I
describe the DeShaney majority's reasoning and employ established due
process doctrine to provide another view of the constitutional propriety
of state inaction. Second, I create an institutional context to explain why
the Court's view that state inaction does not violate due process is both
inconsistent with the responsibility that government bears for the welfare
of citizens and outdated given the extensive role that administrative
agencies play in our society. In situations such as DeShaney, government
has a duty to protect weak members of society regardless of prior govern-
mental actions. Further, the DeShaney context, in which government
took an active role, gives rise to an even stronger argument for govern-
ment responsibility. Building on this foundation, I base my argument for
aggressive federal judicial intervention to monitor and prevent state ad-
ministrative failure on two grounds: (1) the responsibility of federal
courts to protect citizens against state officials; and (2) the consequences
for local democracy that result from unrestrained state administrative
failure. From a local democracy standpoint, judicial intervention will
keep responsibility for administrative action within the confines of the
local political community, making local government more accountable
for administrative failure and thus more democratic.
I. THE NORMS OF DFSHANEY
DeShaney symbolizes the breakdown of institutions. The first insti-
tution that failed to function properly was a family. In 1980, custody of
one-year-old Joshua DeShaney was awarded to his father, Randy
Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U.L. REV. 277, 323-
24 (1988) [hereinafter Beermann, Official Torts].
8. See eg., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (no due process violation when random and
unauthorized act of state official leads to deprivation of property and state provides adequate
postdeprivation remedy); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) ("IThe Due Process Clause
is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official."). But ef Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct.
975 (1990) (Parratt does not apply if claim is for violation of substantive due process violation or if
officials could have provided hearing to prevent foreseeable harms).
9. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202-03; Beermann, Official Torts, supra note 7, at 323-24.
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DeShaney, by a Wyoming court as part of his parents' divorce. Randy
moved to Wisconsin after the divorce, taking Joshua with him; by 1982
Randy had begun a pattern of violent child abuse that ended in 1984 with
Joshua "suffer[ing] brain damage so severe that he is expected to spend
the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly re-
tarded."10  Apparently no family members came to Joshua's aid:
Joshua's mother surfaced only to initiate the section 1983 case that even-
tually made its way to the Supreme Court; the only other "family" per-
son mentioned is Randy's girlfriend, whom social workers encouraged to
move out of Randy's house as part of a program to prevent the abuse to
Joshua. 11
The Winnebago County Department of Social Services (the Depart-
ment) was the next institution to break down. 12 From the Supreme
Court's opinion, we learn only a few details of the mistakes made by the
Department and its social workers. After Joshua was treated at a hospi-
tal for suspicious injuries, the Department quickly obtained an order that
granted the hospital temporary custody of Joshua, but three days later an
ad hoc "Child Protection Team" decided that the evidence was not suffi-
cient to keep Joshua from his father. The Team did, however, initiate a
process through which Randy DeShaney agreed with the Department
that Marie, Randy's girlfriend, would move out of the house and that
Joshua would be sent to a Head Start school program. 13
Marie never moved out, Joshua never went to the school, and less
than two months after the agreement, Joshua went back to the hospital
for treatment of suspicious injuries. Over the next few months, social
workers who visited the DeShaney household noticed several injuries
that indicated child abuse, and at least once the hospital informed the
Department that it had treated Joshua for injuries arising from what the
hospital officials thought was child abuse. Further, on several visits to
the DeShaney home, social workers were told that Joshua was either
10. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
11. The court of appeals opinion provides a few more details: Randy DeShaney married and
quickly divorced "a woman" on his arrival in Wisconsin; that woman's lawyer told police in 1982
that Randy had hit Joshua. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d
298, 299 (7th Cir. 1987). We also learn from the court of appeals that Randy's girlfriend was named
Marie, that she brought Joshua to the hospital for treatment at least once, and that social workers
wanted Marie out of the house because they suspected (due to accusations by Randy DeShaney) that
she also was abusing Joshua. See ide at 299-300.
12. The DeShaney situation is not unique. One report states that 25-50% of child abuse fatali-
ties occur after social service agencies know of the family's problems. See Comment, Abused Chil-
dren and State-Created Protection Agencies A Proposed Section 1983 Standard, 57 U. CN. L. REV.
1419, 1419 n.1 (1989) (citing Uhlig, Preventing Child Abuse: When Early Hints are Not Enough.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1987, at B1, col. 3) [hereinafter Comment Abused Children].
13. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
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sleeping or too sick to see them. Despite the evidence of child abuse, and
the social worker's personal belief that "the phone would ring some day
and Joshua would be dead," 14 the Department took no action either to
protect Joshua from his father or to contact Joshua's mother until
Joshua's brain damage left him paralyzed and retarded.
The Court's brief and formulaic opinion belies the difficulty of the
issues underlying DeShaney. Before DeShaney, a conflict festered in the
lower federal courts over whether government failure to protect citizens
from private misconduct violated due process. Under the leadership of
Judge Richard Posner, several Seventh Circuit cases denied that local
government inaction violated due process. These cases included the fail-
ure of a fire department dispatcher to send an ambulance to a caller in
distress, 15 failure to allow firefighters into the fire station to get equip-
ment to fight a fire during a firefighters' strike, 16 failure of police officers
to rescue occupants of a burning car around which they were directing
traffic, 17 and failure of an FBI informant and an FBI agent to prevent a
murder committed by a third party.'8 Other circuits had decided that, at
least in limited circumstances, the failure of government agents to protect
people from private misconduct can violate due process. 19
14. Id at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of So-
cial Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1987)).
15. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (opinion by Judge Easter-
brook with a concurring opinion by Judge Posner).
16. Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984) (opinion by Judge Pell).
17. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983) (opinion by Judge Posner), cerL
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). But see White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (opinion by
Judge Eschbach) (holding police officers liable when minor children were left alone in car on high-
way after arrest of their guardian).
18. Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1984) (opinion by Judge Eschbach). This case
involved a federal, not local, agent, but the court analyzed the case under the same due process
principles that it uses in cases against local government agencies and agents.
19. See eg., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (civil
rights complaint brought by father of five-year-old girl beaten to death by mother and mother's
boyfriend stated a valid claim; father alleged that county welfare agency, which found that child had
been abused, had returned child to mother upon condition that boyfriend be denied access to child
without adequately investigating situation); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94, 194 n.II (4th
Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985) (in child abuse case, the court recognized a possibility
of a claim against agency workers for failure to affirmatively protect, but in this case the caseworkers
had a good faith immunity defense); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425-26 (9th
Cir. 1988) (in spousal abuse case, court recognized that in "hypothetical" cases the police may have
a duty to intervene, but not in this case). But see Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23
(1st Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 802 (1986) (murder by furloughed inmate could not be basis for
section 1983 action against state prison officials); Havpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820
F.2d 923, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1987) (grandmother of victim who was discharged from children's hospi-
tal and put in custody of mother by state officials denied section 1983 action because state officials
violated no affirmative duty under state law); Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826
F.2d 1030, 1034-37 (11th Cir. 1987) (in case where county policy of ambulance transport only to
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DeShaney resolved this conflict with apparent firmness: The Court
held that "the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right
to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not de-
prive the individual." 20 The content and tone of the opinion leave no
doubt that the Court intended categorically to deny what it characterized
as claims to government aid.21 The Court explicitly rejected, for exam-
ple, the "special relationship" argument that would hold the government
responsible for dangers it knew of and had begun to address.22 The only
category of cases for which the Court indicated the possibility of a due
process duty to prevent private misconduct are those that involve injuries
to people either in government custody23 or perhaps those in private fos-
ter care at government direction.24
The Court purported to base its decision on the linguistic and histor-
ical meaning of the due process clause. As my colleague Aviam Soifer
has demonstrated, however, the Court's history is seriously incomplete.25
Strong historical support exists for the view that the Framers of the four-
teenth amendment meant to remedy the failure of state agents and agen-
cies to prevent private misconduct, most notably racial violence directed
against the newly freed slaves.26 Further, the Court knew of this history
since an essay discussing it was appended to one of the briefs.27 But the
certain hospitals, court found no constitutional duty on part of county to drive patient to hospital of
choice where patient's physician was waiting).
20. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
21. See id4 at 196-97. But see Thomas Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a
Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and its Aftermat. 66 WAsH. L. REv. 107, 109 (1991) (arguing that
DeShaney is far less rigid and uncertain than some commentators believe).
22. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-98; see also Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983
Liabilityfor Failure to Act, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1048, 1063 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Actionable
Inaction] ("tort concepts of special relationships... fail to provide the necessary constitutional
foundation for the duty to be actionable under section 1983").
23. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199. The Court has construed government's duties to prisoners
fairly narrowly. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
24. See DeShaney 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
25. See Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1513, 1521-22 (1989).
26. See Edward Keynes, The Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and State Inaction:
Did the Authors of the Enforcement Act of 1871 Intend Civil Liability for the States' Failure to
Protect Individual Rights (Sept. 5, 1988) (unpublished manuscript), reprinted in Appendix to Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 15, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189 (No. 87-154); see also Aviam Soifer, Protecting
Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 674, 700-05 (1979)
(arguing that after the Civil War a primary objective of federal law was to force states to provide
adequate protection). It has been argued elsewhere that political history and judicial precedent sup-
port the view that "government is in some circumstances required to redress one citizen's violation
of another's common law rights." Richard Stewart & Cass Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1309 (1982).
27. See E. Keynes, supra note 26.
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Court, in half a paragraph, denied that the Framers of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause intended to impose peacekeeping duties
on local government-a half of a paragraph that made no reference to
historical material and collapsed the historical intent behind the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.28 The absence of
citations to historical material, and the Court's failure to discuss contrary
evidence appended to the DeShaneys' brief, leaves one to wonder
whether evidence exists to support the Court's view.
The Court's opinion is very clear on one point: It stands as a broad
principle against government duties to prevent private misconduct.29
The Court underscored the breadth of the principle by supporting the
decision with references to earlier denials of constitutional rights to gov-
ernment services. For example, the Court noted in DeShaney that it has
held that due process does not require that government provide abortions
or housing to the poor.30 Insofar as these cases differ from those that
concern ensuring competent provision of services by local agencies, the
Court's analogy strengthens the impression that the Court intended to
deny right to action claims once and for all.31
The Court also analogized DeShaney to the line of government tort
cases that hold that government negligence does not violate the due pro-
28. The Court wrote that the "Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests
of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added). It is dangerous to equate the meaning of the two due process
clauses because the conditions leading to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment were signifi-
cantly different from those leading to 'the fifth amendment. Forcing states to provide adequate pro-
tection may have been very important in the period after the Civil War. See supra note 26.
29. DeShaney has not succeeded in completely foreclosing claims based on government's failure
to rescue. The Seventh Circuit, whose cases are usually very supportive of DeShaney's reasoning, see
supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text, recently held that a county failure to rescue a drowning
boy when county policy and action prevented others from attempting to rescue might violate due
process. See Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1431 (1990) (reversing the dismissal of a section
1983 action on finding that plaintiff's right to life was violated by a "policy of arbitrarily cutting off
private sources of rescue without providing a meaningful alternative"). See generally Eaton & Wells,
supra note 21, at 124-27 (describing situations in which relief might still be available for government
failure to rescue).
30. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
31. Professor Currie has noted, after a survey of precedent, that although for the most part the
Court has not recognized positive constitutional rights, there are cases in which "the Supreme Court,
sometimes very persuasively, has found in negatively phrased provisions constitutional duties that
can in some sense be described as positive." David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 864, 886 (1986). For an analysis of U.S. Supreme Court cases that might
be construed to read positive rights into the Constitution, see id. at 872-86. Among the cases that
Professor Currie pointed to are: Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
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cess clause.32 The Court did not use a state of mind requirement to de-
cide DeShaney, although that issue was available and less controversial
than the broad inaction question.33 Instead, the Court relied on state of
mind cases for their admonition that torts of local officials are generally
not of federal concern unless the local official's conduct falls into the
amorphous category of "abuse of power."'' Absent an abuse of power,
the decision of whether and in what circumstances to provide a tort rem-
edy remains a local matter, without implications for federal civil rights
law. The Court assumed, without addressing the issue, that the failure to
intervene in DeShaney did not constitute an abuse of power, apparently
on the ground that failure to provide a government service cannot
amount to an abuse of power unless invidious discrimination produces
the failure to act.35
Justice Brennan's DeShaney dissent suggested important breaks in
the logic of the majority opinion, most notably in the majority's charac-
terization of the Department's involvement as inaction. In his most pow-
erful argument, Justice Brennan suggested that the state has somehow
displaced private avenues of relief from child abuse, and therefore an
abused child is in a position similar to a prisoner, stripped of alternative
means of self-protection. 36 As Justice Brennan pointed out, state law re-
quires that nearly all reports of child abuse be directed to the local de-
partment of social services. 37 One can only speculate about the degree to
which the presence of state law and the existence of local social services
departments displaced or discouraged others from becoming involved in
32. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
33. The Court's recent efforts to keep government official torts from automatically becoming
fourteenth amendment violations have included holding that a state of mind more culpable than
negligence is required for conduct to violate the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) ("It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United
States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same
concerns."). In DeShaney, the Court might have inquired into whether the state of mind of the
defendants was sufficient to state a claim of a fourteenth amendment violation. The question would
be whether the allegations amounted to anything more than negligence. For a more complete dis-
cussion of the state of mind issues in DeShaney, see Eaton & Wells, supra note 21.
34. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196, 202 ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to prevent government 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instru-
ment of oppression' ..... ) (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)). The abuse of
power standard has been used to limit due process liability to situations in which government offi-
cials allegedly acted outrageously, beyond the run-of-the-mill tortious conduct. See Daniels, 474
U.S. at 331; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). The standard has
never been clearly defined.
35. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97.
36. See id. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. See Wis. STAT. ANNe. § 48.981 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988-89) (cited by Justice Brennan in
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208). Other states have similar statutes. See eg., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 119,
§ 51A-51C (1989).
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individual cases of child abuse. Perhaps the hospital never would have
released Joshua to his abusing parent had they known that the Depart-
ment was not fulfilling its obligations; perhaps doctors would have re-
ferred Joshua's case to private charitable organizations; or perhaps
Joshua's mother or some other relative would have been called much
earlier.
If Justice Brennan's analysis established that the state's involvement
potentially displaced other avenues of aid, therefore constituting govern-
ment action that contributed to Joshua's injuries, it must still be demon-
strated that the Department's errors violated due process. The Court left
little doubt that it would apply the due process clause narrowly enough
to avoid a conclusion that the Department's failure was unconstitutional,
even if the inaction label did not apply.38 Justice Brennan admitted that
under his analysis, one must still establish that the local officials' conduct
was arbitrary, oppressive, and an abuse of power.39
By looking at how the state system displaces private avenues of re-
lief, Justice Brennan was on the right track. His argument lost focus,
however, when he reached the merits of the case: Justice Brennan still
would have required that the government failure to prevent the private
misconduct amount to an abuse of power. Part II discusses how this
requirement is inconsistent with recognized due process principles and
how this approach unnecessarily limits the federal courts' power to re-
dress local administrative failure.
II. DESHANEY AND DUE PROCESS
In this Part, I address two themes. First, in a theoretical fashion I
explore the due process issues raised and argue that under recognized
due process principles, Joshua DeShaney had a right to social services
intervention that the Court should have protected. Second, I return to
the issue of "abuse of power," and discuss whether the Court should
38. The Court's opinion suggests that the department might actually have done nothing wrong
because:
[H]ad they moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would
likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child relation-
ship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the present
charge of failure to provide adequate protection.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. Although it is inconceivable that the Court really believes that the true
culprit in Joshua's injuries is the due process clause (nothing in the record suggests that local officials
failed to act out of concern for liability), its portrayal of local officials as stuck in the impossible
situation of trying to do their jobs while also trying to avoid civil rights liability is consistent with a
conservative view of civil rights enforcement. See Jack Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section
1983 with Special Focus on Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 91-92 (1989) [hereinafter Beer-
mann, Section 1983].
39. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 211-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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have found an abuse and whether such a finding should be necessary in a
case like DeShaney.
A. Due Process and Protecting the Powerless
This Section divides the argument for a constitutional duty to pro-
tect people in situations such as that of Joshua DeShaney into two differ-
ent parts. First, I lay the groundwork for an argument that a duty
should be recognized regardless of the existence of state programs di-
rected at providing protection from abuse. The argument here, in a nut-
shell, is that within the current structure of society, it is arbitrary and
outrageous for government not to provide such protection. Second, by
analogy to entitlement cases, I strengthen the argument for government
aid. The point is that there is a very strong normative basis for holding
the state to its promises of aid-promises here in the form of statutory
requirements of intervention to prevent child abuse.
1. The Duty to Protect the Powerless. Constitutional interpreta-
tion occurs against a normative background that evolves and develops in
light of many factors, including the structure of society, social consensus,
and the general role of government and other institutions. This means
that the most promising method of normative development requires an
understanding of an issue in light of the fabric into which an interpreta-
tion must be woven. Appeals to language and specific history, especially
regarding open-textured clauses such as the due process clause, may be
helpful but are not the end of the analysis.
The Court ignores the normative background and treats the argu-
ment that government has a constitutional duty to protect people from
private misconduct as if it were revolutionary and contrary to the ideals
of a "free society." This aspect of the Court's opinion strikes me as bi-
zarre. Through criminal law, tort law, and laws on consumer protection
and fraud in economic activity, government seeks to protect people from
private misconduct. Government engages in this type of protection
through the court system, police forces, social service agencies, other ad-
ministrative agencies, and to a certain extent through the welfare sys-
tem.4° Imagine, for example, the public reaction if a state decriminalized
child and spouse abuse on the grounds that such abuse constitutes a pri-
vate family matter.41
40. For example, the social service system and the courts team up to compel non-custodial
parents to pay child support.
41. This hypothetical was raised by my colleague Joe Singer in a class we taught together in
which the briefs in DeShaney were discussed. One can only speculate on the Rehnquist Court's
reaction to legislation decriminalizing intra-family violence. The question for due process purposes
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The normative support for a government duty to protect people
from private misconduct arises, then, from an examination of social insti-
tutions as they exist here and now.42 The propriety of society's choices
regarding allocation of resources such as food, shelter, and police protec-
tion can only meaningfully be measured against society's possibilities,
and the way existing allocations affect the security of its members. Thus,
I am not troubled that the arguments presented here-that the state is
obligated to provide some protective services in the absence of state
promises-would have seemed revolutionary to the society that pro-
duced the fourteenth amendment. Due process evolves against a social
background.43
My argument that government should be held to a duty to protect
people from abuse, such as that suffered by Joshua DeShaney, thus de-
would be whether government failure to intervene deprived the victim of life or liberty without due
process. There has been litigation in the federal and state courts over local policies under which laws
against assault and battery were not enforced in cases of spouse abuse, and some courts have held
that local failure to prevent spouse abuse in some situations may violate the rights of the victim. See
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988) (restraining order and notice of
abuse enough to create duty to protect); Bartalone v. Berrien County, 643 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Mich.
1986) (claim against officer who consciously chose not to protect because abuser was spouse); Thur-
man v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (permitting equal protection claim
based on police duty to protect women from spouse abuse); see also Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582,
393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (holding that while declaratory and injunctive relief were
not appropriate in this particular case, allegations that police and other officials repeatedly failed to
enforce statutes and rules relating to spousal abuse presented a justiciable controversy). To the
extent that local police inaction amounts to de facto legalization of spouse abuse and perhaps child
abuse, it should, and arguably would, be rejected under due process and equal protection scrutiny.
Although I do not agree with the particulars, a German court has illustrated how contemporary
thought might place obligations on government to act. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Federal Constitutional Court held that failure to prohibit abortion violated the fetus' right to life.
See Currie, supra note 31, at 869-72 (discussing the German abortion decision reported at BVerfGE
39, 1 (1975), translated in 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAc. & PRoC. 605 (1976)). The German court's
decision indicates it also might find that the right to life was violated by legalization of intra-family
violence since the basis for its abortion decision was that the fetus was entitled to protection afforded
persons under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The victims of intra-family
violence presumably would be entitled to the same protection as a fetus.
42. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairnes" Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223,
224-25 (1985) ("ustice as fairness is framed to apply to what I have called the 'basic structure' of a
modem constitutional democracy.... By this structure, I mean such a society's main political,
social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social coopera-
tion.") (footnote omitted). Rawls' point about the development of justice as fairness supports my
view that notions of fundamental fairness or government arbitrariness are not fixed concepts capable
of purely linguistic development. Rather, such concepts evolve with changes in the social structure.
43. I do not mean to argue that this is the only way that substantive due process rights arise or
evolve, or that social change inevitably increases the scope of such rights. On the first point, there
may be some rights that arise and evolve through processes of moral or constitutional reasoning that
do not depend on examining social institutions. On the second point, if social change results in the
ascendancy of non-governmental institutions, then constitutional rights against government might
contract. At the same time, non-constitutional rights against the non-governmental institutions
might increase through reliance norms and restrictions on bargaining power and the like.
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pends on viewing the issue within the context of society's institutions-
how resources are allocated and how government institutions affect the
ability of people to receive aid from other sources. The Court's concep-
tual analysis, characterizing the agency's conduct as inaction and holding
inaction incapable of violating the due process clause, allowed the Court
to avoid such questions and ignore the context in which the "inaction"
took place.44 As developed below, government involvement in today's
society reflects widespread acceptance of the moral argument in favor of
government responsibility. Many people are relatively helpless, and gov-
ernment is heavily involved both in creating and ameliorating that help-
lessness. Such involvement creates dependencies that give rise to further
responsibility.
The brief description of government institutions that follows is
meant to indicate that the Court's blanket distinction between action and
inaction depends on an outmoded conception of ethical developments in
contemporary society. The ethical arguments implicit in this description
tend to be rather open-ended in that the arguments do not contain pre-
cise limits that would allow them to be translated directly into workable
legal doctrines. The arguments may even point toward unlimited gov-
ernment responsibility for all private misfortune and private miscon-
duct-a plainly unacceptable result. The purpose of this discussion,
however, is not to construct a definitive legal doctrine, but rather to pro-
vide normative support for legal developments along the lines of greater
government responsibility for the welfare of people in cases such as
DeShaney. The ultimate legal doctrine might be substantially narrower,
and I hope more precise, than all of the implications that the normative
argument might entail.45 But my hope is that the arguments detailed
here provide the normative underpinnings for these developments.
All institutions-including the family, the corporation, and the
school system-structure themselves in response to the institutions that
surround them. As government agencies become more pervasive and
more powerful, the ethical argument in favor of a governmental responsi-
bility to intervene becomes stronger: Other institutions develop around
those agencies, and people rely on the agencies for the protective services
they provide. For example, if a strong government-based social services
network exists, private charity may develop to fill the gaps in the social
44. The plaintiff in DeShaney argued that the failure to aid Joshua "shock[ed] the conscience."
See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) (quoting
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
45. For example, a court deciding to accept my arguments might limit government responsibil-
ity to situations involving helpless victims or situations in which, because the state has begun to help
the victim, there is a special relationship between the victim and the state, or where the state conduct
involved incompetence in administering an existing program rather than the absence of a program.
Vol. 1990:1078] 1089
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
services network, but it would be foolish for private groups to duplicate
services already available.46 Moreover, the New Deal and Great Society
programs belie the Court's image of "free society" as a place free from
government involvement.
The pervasive role of administrative agencies in the United States
underscores the importance of administrative accountability. Agencies
shape our lives in a myriad of ways, from influencing inflation and unem-
ployment rates47 to establishing rules of conduct for the workplace48 to
determining the cost of medical services to the poor.49 One need only
examine a directory of government agencies to realize that an extensive
number of agencies exist and to see how greatly they affect our lives.
These agencies operate at the local, state, federal, and international
levels, and sometimes they involve a governmental commitment to pro-
tect individuals .from misconduct by third parties.50
The earliest indication of government's contemporary commitment
to protect people from private conduct is the massive intervention in the
economy that began in the early 20th century and continues to the pres-
ent. The severity of the Depression, coupled with a changed political
climate, led to the creation of programs designed to ensure that people
affected by the economic downturn had money, food, shelter, and jobs.51
These programs included the regulation of securities markets to prevent
manipulation and fraud by sellers of securities and the regulation of the
banking system which was designed to protect private parties from mis-
46. For an argument that corporate activity might displace private avenues of support and thus
create reliance interests deserving of legal protections, see Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988).
47. See generally The Federal Reserve System Act, 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1988); PAUL SAMUELSON
& WILLIAM NoRDHAUs, ECONOMICS 267-68 (1lth ed. 1989).
48. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in the workplace).
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1305-1385 (1988) (Medicare); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396q (1988)
(Medicaid).
50. I do not intend here to get into the arguments concerning whether regulation benefits any-
one but the small interest group, often the regulated industry, that lobbied for the regulation. See
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135
(1957), reprinted in THE PoLmcAL ECONOMY: READINGS IN THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF
AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 12 (T. Ferguson & J. Rogers eds. 1984) [hereinafter THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY]; see also infra text accompanying notes 95-96 & 106-07. Whatever the case may be for
certain programs of economic regulation, I doubt I would get much of an argument over the aaser-
tion that social services agencies are designed to help the abused children, and are not designed to
preserve the domination of their parents. Helping the children, in many cases, involves providing
aid to parents to alleviate the causes of abuse, but my guess is that social programs to combat child
abuse do not have parents as a client group primarily benefiting from the services.
51. See WILLIAM LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL
120 (1963).
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conduct, particularly fraud and mismanagement by managers of pri-
vately owned banks.52
The War on Poverty and the other programs of the Great Society
renewed the governmental commitment to help protect people from the
effects of private economic circumstances and other misfortunes. Social
services agencies proliferated in order to cope with social problems that
included child abuse, mental illness, drug addiction, and alcoholism. 53
These programs did not differentiate between harms caused by the gov-
ernment and those caused by third-party private individuals: The pro-
grams attacked problems regardless of the cause.
The lack of focus on purely public harms in government's expanded
administrative role suggests a de facto rejection of the distinction be-
tween public and private conduct. Because social ills are socially caused,
it is futile to attempt to trace specific harms to either the government or
private individuals. In most cases in which non-government agents in-
flict harm, government policies are implicated. For example, how can it
be accurate to state that the government is not implicated in the inflic-
tion of Joshua's injuries?54 The family is an institution, recognized and
shaped by state policies.55 A state court awarded custody of Joshua to
his father, and government policies contributed to the breakdown of the
family that left Joshua without a support system to help resist his father's
violence.56 Government economic and financial policies purport to bal-
ance economic growth against inflation fears, thereby affecting the availa-
bility of jobs and the distribution of wealth,57 factors that might easily
contribute to conditions that lead to abuse within families and pressure
to relocate away from established family and social support systems.
Government's involvement in contemporary society contributes two
elements to the argument that government should be held responsible in
situations such as DeShaney. First, the extensive system of government
52. See, ag., Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1811
(1988)) (creating Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77A-77AA (1988)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48
Stat. 881 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77A-77K (1988)).
53. See DORIS KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 210 (1976).
54. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (he state
"played no part" in the creation of the dangers Joshua faced; "nor did it do anything to render him
any more vulnerable to them.").
55. See Fran Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH J.L. REF. 835
(1985) (arguing that even a state policy which espouses non-interventionist rhetoric inevitably shapes
the family as an institution); see also Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For
Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 933 (1985) (examining state intervention in the family in the
context of medical treatment decisions for severely handicapped newborns).
56. See Olsen, supra note 55, at 839-40.
57. See HUGH DALTON, THE PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 10 (1932).
1091Vol. 1990:1078]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
agencies designed to aid private parties in situations of need indicates a
general social commitment to the provision of such aid. This extensive
government involvement in private conduct also belies the notion that
creating government duties to protect private parties entails a radical
move away from the ideals of our present constitutional order. Second,
the pervasiveness of government involvement creates responsibilities.
The more government involvement shapes society, the more responsibil-
ity government bears for social dislocations that contribute to private
harms. The ethical argument for a government duty to prevent private
misconduct thus flows easily from the institutional changes that have oc-
curred in recent times, since these institutional changes are themselves
products of contemporary ethical norms. The moral evolution from the
laissez-faire individualist ethic and the transformation to an administra-
tive state has affected both private and public law. Whether cyclical or
continuous, the legal legitimacy of extensive government involvement in
daily life is not open to serious doubt.58 On the public law side, the earli-
est indications that the change had reached the Supreme Court were the
decisions that ended the Lochner era-decisions that recognized that pri-
vate coercion was an appropriate matter for public concern.5 9 On the
private law side, the rise of reliance norms in contract law and the evolu-
tion of fault and strict liability standards in tort exemplified the effect of
the ethical evolution.60
The 20th century has also seen a revolution in views concerning
government responsibility. 61 The ethical move from individualism to
collective responsibility helps explain how extensive welfare programs
came into existence without a great deal of social resistance-a social
consensus regarding collective responsibility for the welfare of the weak
58. See KENNETH WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
35 (1982).
59. See, eg., West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining minimum wage legis-
lation against due process challenge and thus signaling the end to the Lochner era). For a discussion
of these cases, see Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionallsr:
United States Supreme Cour, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HmiT. REV. 249 (1987).
60. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 2.A (1982) (discussing development of reli-
ance theory in contract law); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN DOBBS, ROBERT KEETON, DAVID OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 97-98 (1984) (discussing the development of
strict liability in products liability law).
61. According to Theodore Lowi's analysis, the increase in commercial intercourse in the 19th
century United States was coupled with a legal/ethical view of individualism through which liability
and responsibility were assigned according to concepts of blame and fault. See Theodore Lowi, The
Welfare State" Ethical Foundations and Constitutional Remedies 101 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 200-04
(1986). In the early 20th century, courts rejected individual blame and perceived injuries as social
costs that government should allocate according to a variety of factors, including risk avoidance
potential and ability to pay and spread costs. See id. at 207. Lowi documents similar ethical move-
ments in other fields. See id. at 207-13.
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developed before the welfare programs were enacted. The ideals that led
the United States to adopt broad social welfare protection also have led
to the establishment of local welfare agencies designed to both support
the family and fight misconduct directed against the weak. Just as we no
longer trust our economic welfare to the uncertainties of the unregulated
marketplace, we no longer trust our personal welfare to the uncertainties
of the weakened family structure--a governmental safety net has eclipsed
the protections once provided by family.
The ethical commitment to protect the weak increases as the rela-
tionship between the potential protector and the party in need develops.
Often, the protector and the potential oppressor are one and the same;
for example, changes in contract law require stronger parties to look af-
ter weaker ones.62 Generalized duties to rescue are rarely found in the
law, but once a relationship exists, the party with superior position may
be required to look after the safety of the weaker party.63
The extensive programs aimed at ensuring individual welfare64 evi-
dence that the political community feels the responsibility to help people
who cannot help themselves. Further, within the fabric of a society in
which government action is pervasive, the consequences of government
failure to act can be much worse than if government were totally out of
the picture; thus ethical problems with government failure to act assume
greater importance. Because imposing positive duties on government
raises questions about allocation of government resources, these
problems may be somewhat less amenable to judicial resolution than
other constitutional problems. But in the extreme cases in which a duty
to act is likely to be recognized (e.g., government failure to act when
62. See HUGH COLLINS, TE LAW OF CNTRACT 66-70 (1986) (the doctrine of unequal bar-
gaining power invites courts to strike a balance between permitting a party to benefit from the con-
tract and requiring minimal standards of altruism); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms, 41 MD. L. REv. 563
(1982) (arguing that paternalist motives explain contract and tort law doctrines of allocation of risk
better than ideas of unequal bargaining power); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. Rnv. 1685 (1976) (delineating the altruistic and individualistic ten-
sions in the law). For a doctrinal example, see the warranties in the Uniform Commercial Code that
impose warranties upon the party with superior knowledge. See U.C.C §§ 2-314, 2-315, and 2-316
(1988) (sections dealing with implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose,
and exclusion or modification of warranties). Contemporary products liability law has a similar
effect. See RBSrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (dealing with strict liability of "Seller
of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer").
63. In many European countries, there is a general duty on private parties to rescue, usually
limited to situations in which the rescuer would not be endangered by the effort. See LEON
SHELEFF, THE BYsTANDER 101-22 (1978). Compare Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343
(1959) (no common law duty to rescue decedent from drowning in strip mining trench dug by de.
fendant where defendant stood by and watched decedent drown) with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519
(1973) (creating a duty to rescue where rescue can be accomplished without danger to rescuer).
64. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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groups recognized to be in weak positions are threatened), the outra-
geousness and arbitrariness of government decisions ring loud and clear.
Considerations like those above form the groundwork for the recognition
of a strong normative basis for government responsibility to act.
The arguments above do not depend on the existence of government
promises of aid. In cases like DeShaney, however, in which government
has promised to provide protection against private misconduct, the nor-
mative support for a constitutional theory is strengthened immensely.
First, all of the factors that point toward a generalized duty in today's
society are strengthened-the existence of a program shows that there is
a political consensus in favor of the provision of the services. Second, the
reliance on aid is likely to be much greater when a specific program is in
place. Third, the possibility that state activity has supplanted other
sources of relief, whether de facto or de jure, is increased by the existence
of a government program.
2. Government Fulfillment of Promises of Aid. Although I have
argued above that in today's society government has an affirmative duty
to act to save victims of child abuse regardless of preexisting programs,
one may doubt the logic of DeShaney without accepting such an affirma-
tive duty. The Supreme Court has recognized that provision of services
to help combat private misconduct is constitutionally required in some
circumstances. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., the Court held that
Illinois could not dismiss an employment discrimination claim based
solely on the state commission's own failure to hold a hearing on time.65
The Court held that the mandatory language of the Illinois statute enti-
tled Logan to employ the investigatory, adjudicatory, and remedial facili-
ties the state had set up. The state could not deprive Logan of those
services without good reason. 66
Logan stands against the Court's reasoning in DeShaney in several
respects. First, both Logan and DeShaney looked to the state for protec-
tion against private misconduct. Second, both challenged the failure of
government agencies-in Logan the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission and in DeShaney the Winnebago County Department of So-
cial Services-to fulfill their obligations under mandatory language in
state statutes.67 Finally, both claimed that the due process clause pro-
65. 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982).
66. Stewart and Sunstein also have noted that Logan applies the due process clause to compel
agency action to combat private misconduct. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1287 n.393.
67. I recognize that the analogy between Logan and DeShaney is not perfect; in Logan, the
state promised to adjudicate claims of private misconduct, while in DeShaney the state's promises
were aimed atpreventing the private misconduct from occurring. This difference may appear signifi.
cant because if Logan's reasoning can be restricted to procedural due process cases, it would provide
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tected the right to services from an established government agency re-
quired by state law to serve individuals such as Logan and DeShaney.68
Once we understand that DeShaney involved a preexisting state pro-
gram,69 the arguments that surround the constitutional propriety of the
system's failure to protect Joshua look very different from those that ap-
peared in the Court's opinion. Contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
portrayal of the issues in the opinion, DeShaney involved no generalized
constitutional claim to government benefits such as a right to food and
shelter. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion repeatedly posed the
no support to the substantive due process argument in DeShaney. As only a procedural due process
case, Logan would support a claim to process in cases in which either the only state involvement is
the provision of an adjudicatory forum or where the state has deprived a party of a benefit without
providing adequate process. DeShaney analogized to Logan, goes beyond these situations and
would impose substantive liability on government for failing to prevent private misconduct. How-
ever, I would read Logan more broadly and argue that when government promises any sort of
benefit in a situation like DeShaney, it should be required to fulfill its promLs4. The argument under
an entitlement theory is strengthened in DeShaney by Wisconsin's general rule that a duty owed by a
state official to the public at large also is owed to the individual beneficiaries of the program. See
Wood v. Milin, 134 Wis. 2d 279, 288-89, 397 N.W.2d 479, 482-83 (1986) (rejecting the public duty
doctrine and holding that building inspector may be held liable for negligent failure to inspect). But
see Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 334 (RIl. 1989) (private party may not sue public official for
nonperformance of public duty). Even if the state provides a cause of action in its courts against the
government officials in cases like DeShaney, it promised more than adjudication: it promised action
toward prevention that was not taken in DeShaney.
The attempt to distinguish Logan as a procedural due process case without relevance to claims
other than to a hearing fails because Logan itself makes no sense as merely a procedural case. In the
usual procedural due process case, a hearing is required to determine whether the substantive
grounds for taking an action or extinguishing a claim exist. But in Logan there was no doubt that
grounds for extinguishing the claim existed. (The hearing was clearly not held within the statutorily
required time.) Rather, the Court, in order to require additional process, had to substantively disap-
prove of the grounds for terminating the claim. As argued above, the Court's decision can be sup-
ported on the ground that people are entitled to rely on the state's promise to fight discrimination,
and the state cannot avoid that promise surreptitiously, with surprising procedural or substantive
bars. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. Insofar as Logan stands for an obligation of
government to keep its promises, it supports the argument in favor of liability in DeShaney.
I thus reject the argument that "inactivity cannot plausibly be deemed a deprivation of an
entitlement or liberty." See Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction 83 COLUM. L. REv.
627, 632 (1983); see also ad at 632 n.31 (arguing that to label agency implementation of the laws an
entitlement, and characterizing failure to implement laws a deprivation of that entitlement "would
stretch the notions of liberty and property so far as to undermine their coherence and usefulness").
To the contrary, I think that the best understanding of Logan and the due process norms it imple-
ments require that agency inaction be addressed under a sort of entitlement theory. At the very
least, specific statutory directives should be a strong factor in favor of finding a due process violation.
Further, entitlement theory has until now specifically addressed only the procedural aspects of due
process, and the Note, like the DeShaney Court, does not apply traditional notions of substantive
due process analysis.
68. See Frank Michelman, Foreward- On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 9 (1969) (the Court's "egalitarian" interventions "could be more soundly
and satisfyingly understood as vindication of a state's duty to protect against certain hazards which
are endemic in an unequal society").
69. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
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DeShaney question as whether "the Constitution imposes upon the State
affirmative duties of care." 70 However, the question does not turn on the
imposition of a new duty. Rather, the case involved a state's failure to
carry out promises it had already made to protect helpless victims,
promises that the local political community had decided to make. Fur-
ther, the victim was a helpless member of society whose victimizer was
assigned custody by a court decree.71 And Logan teaches that once
states set up agencies to aid in protecting people from third party miscon-
duct, government should not be allowed to disregard promises.
Government institutions invite people to rely on their programs.
Reliance on government institutions leads to a strong normative argu-
ment for government responsibility because government may crowd out
other sources of aid. When government fails to act as individuals legiti-
mately anticipated, it is as if government has yanked a chair out from
under a person as she settled into the chair and simultaneously discour-
aged others from aiding the falling person by assuring them that govern-
ment would provide the chair. Thus, the existence of a social services
department in DeShaney strengthens the case for judicial intervention by
raising the possibility that absent the local agency, people in the commu-
nity might have aided Joshua on their own.72 State law that granted
jurisdiction over child abuse reports to the local social services adminis-
tration and that directed the agency to prevent the abuse undoubtedly
affected the amount of private help readily available for Joshua.73
70. Id. at 198. Chief Justice Rehnquist fails to see the irony either in his portrayal of Joshua as
a victim in "free society" or in his comment that the social worker might have been deterred from
acting out of a fear of due process liability for unduly interfering in family privacy. See Id. at 203. If
the DeShaney family had any due process rights against state interference, then those rights were
created by the Supreme Court-also a part of the government. Thus, under the Chief Justice's
reasoning, government action (i.e., recognition of due process privacy rights by the Court) at least in
part, prevented the social service agency from rescuing Joshua. It is thus government action-here,
creation of rights by the Supreme Court-and not the natural state of a "free society" that contrib-
utes to Joshua's plight.
71. Id. at 192.
72. The factual assumption that the existence of social services agencies means others are less
likely to act is not obviously true. For some people, it might have the opposite effect of encouraging
them to report suspected child abuse, because there is an identifiable agency for receiving the report.
The existence of the agency might increase general social awareness of the problem, thereby increas-
ing rather than decreasing the likelihood that third parties will act. But if the existence of the
agencies is a result of a general feeling that child abuse ought to be brought into the open and
eradicated, then it still might be the case that if government agencies were not created, then the
social pressure would result in more private institutions instead.
73. See Comment, Abused Children, supra note 12, at 1435, 1436-37. The Comment argues
that this displacement creates a special relationship between the victim and the agency, and that
under due process standards a constitutional violation is made out whenever the agents' response to
child abuse information is grossly negligent or reckless.
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B. Abuses of "Abuse of Power"
There is another doctrinal angle in DeShaney that must be explored.
The Court has limited the reach of civil rights liability in recent years by
finding liability only when the government conduct amounted to an
"abuse of government power."74 In DeShaney, the Court supported its
reluctance to base liability on inaction by implying that inaction is rarely,
if ever, abusive. However, there are several good reasons for not inquir-
ing into whether the conduct of the official in DeShaney amounted to an
abuse of power. First, the existence of state statutory promises should
render the abuse of power inquiry irrelevant. 75 Although the Court has
never articulated this reasoning, the Court does not apply the abuse of
power standard when the state misconduct deprives a person of a right
promised by state law.76 For example, in the due process entitlement
cases the Court has never asked whether the failure to convene a hearing
constituted an abuse of power.77 And in Logan, the Court specifically
held that the reason for the state official's failure to convene a timely
hearing was irrelevant: The state had promised to provide services to
fight third-party employment discrimination, and absent a reason related
to the merits of the case, it could not constitutionally fail to keep the
promise.78
Second, the Court's focus on whether the individual conduct
amounts to an abuse of power is too narrow; that type of inquiry does not
ask whether the state provides or allows constitutionally adequate com-
pensation for torts inflicted by state officials.79 Wisconsin places severe
restrictions on tort recovery against officials who perform their duties in
situations in which private parties would face liability for all harm
caused.8 0 The Court, if it insists on requiring an abuse of power stan-
74. Beermann, Official Torts, supra note 7, at 299-300.
75. I have argued in the official tort context that the "abuse of power" standard is inappropriate
because the focus should be not on the individual conduct, but rather on the state's treatment of
claimants as a whole. See ia
76. It is the normative basis, rather than the doctrinal particulars, of the entitlement cases upon
which I am relying. Requiring states to fulfill the promises they make provides a strong check
against arbitrary and unequal action and also holds the local political system accountable. See infra
notes 83-87 & 115 and accompanying text; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
77. See, ag., Cleveland State Bd. of Edue. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (failure to allow
employees opportunity to respond to charges against them was violation of their constitutional
rights).
78. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) ("it is the state system itself that
destroys a complainant's property interest... whether the commission's action is taken through
negligence, maliciousness or otherwise").
79. See Beermann, Official Torts, supra note 7, at 277 passim.
80. As a county agency, the liability of the Winnebago County Department of Social Services is
$50,000. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West Supp. 1989). Further, the employee might be im-
mune from liability unless the conduct was the failure to perform a ministerial duty or was willful
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dard, should analyze whether the state's special treatment of its own
torts is the type of abuse that the fourteenth amendment prohibits in-
stead of focusing on particular conduct.
In fact, the abuse of power standard is not always applied in section
1983 cases, rendering the Court's attitude toward state tort law schizo-
phrenic. In DeShaney, as well as in many other cases, the Court argued
that torts committed by state officials do not automatically constitute vi-
olations of the fourteenth amendment and that the state should be al-
lowed to determine the liability of state officials."' In these cases, the
Court has relied on federalism concerns under which state autonomy
over tort policy becomes a primary concern. But in other cases, the
Court has analyzed whether state tort policy is consistent with the reme-
dial purposes of section 1983, and when state tort policy is inconsistent,
the Court has held that the state rules are inapplicable in federal civil
rights cases.82 When the life and liberty of defenseless citizens become an
issue, the sanctity of state tort law should take a backseat to due process
concerns.
To my mind, the "abuse of power" standard for state official liability
should not be applied at all; government invasion of any recognized per-
sonal interest can cause great harm regardless of whether there has been
an "abuse of power."'8 3 However, the argument against requiring an
abuse of power becomes even stronger in the DeShaney-Logan situation
since the government obligation to address the private misconduct was
and wanton. See Yotvat v. Roth, 95 Wis. 2d 357, 290 N.W.2d 524 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). It is
unclear whether the county remains liable if the official is immune. See Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (local government liable even when constitutional violations made in
good faith); Mid-America Trust Co. v. Moffatt, 158 Ml. App. 3d 372, 511 N.E.2d 964 (1987) (immu-
nizing the type of official conduct at issue in DeShaney).
81. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202; Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986) (due process clause does not impose upon a state the duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect those whom it incarcerates or to compensate them for negligently
inflicted injuries); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (drafters of the fourteenth amendment
did not intend that it become a font of tort law to be superimposed over state systems); Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 227, 285 (1980) (a state tort law violation by a parole board did not unconstitu-
tionally deprive appellants' decedent of life); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (false
imprisonment does not become a violation of the fourteenth amendment merely because the defend-
ant is a state official); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (infliction by state officials of a stigma
to one's reputation does not differ from harm to other interests protected by state law).
82. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (holding Wisconsin notice of claim statute, which
requires notice to state of potential government liability within 120 days of official conduct, inappli-
cable in section 1983 cases); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (state exhaustion of
remedies requirement does not apply in section 1983 suit); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,
243-50 (1989) (federal interest in uniformity and certainty together with importance of section 1983
remedy mean that general state statute of limitations and not specific intentional tort statute applies
to section 1983 actions).
83. See Beermann, Official Torts, supra note 7, at 323-26.
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taken on by the state itself via state law rather than imposed by federal
court construction of the due process clause. This argument strengthens
an already strong case for judicial intervention. Although I do not en-
dorse the "abuse of power" standard in any context, the basis for requir-
ing an abuse of power grows less persuasive where injuries occur, at least
in part, due to local officials' failure to provide aid prescribed by state
law.s4
State law promises of aid make DeShaney a very compelling case for
government responsibility to act. Because Wisconsin specifically directs
private parties to report child abuse to local agencies and directs the local
agencies to intervene to prevent the abuse, Joshua's case is on par with
reliance-based doctrines in contract law that require parties to follow
through on their promises. One could go a step further and argue that
reliance recovery is actually,85 or more properly,8 6 based on the sanctity
of promises. Such an argument would treat society's promise to extend
social services to Joshua as a moral obligation. Further, the specificity of
the state law informs other potential rescuers that Joshua and others like
him will be watched by the state so that they need not intervene.87
84. The Court has narrowly recognized the strength of some of these arguments in its entitle-
ments doctrine, but it has applied the entitlement doctrine only to questions regarding whether due
process required a hearing in connection with the deprivation of a protected interest. See ag.,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Stewart and Sunstein also argue that when there is
an entitlement, due process requires a "private right of initiation," (their term for an action to com-
pel agency action), but they apply the Court's narrow definition of entitlement. See Stewart & Sun-
stein, supra note 26, at 1287. According to Comment, Actionable Inaction, supra note 22, inaction
should be analyzed under an entitlement doctrine. Although the theory underlying the Comment
would require a broader conception of entitlements than that recognized by current law, ultimately
the Comment remains wedded to doctrinal limits on entitlements to government action. See ia at
1068-70. But the logic-and the ethical underpinnings-of the entitlement doctrine argue in favor of
extending the importance of state promises to all controversies regarding state injuries to protected
interests. See Beermann, Official Torts, supra note 7, at 284 (arguing that entitlement dogma should
be extended to all common law torts conimitted by state officials). In DeShaney, the Court did not
reach the entitlement question on the ground that it was not raised below, and thus was not pre-
served for Supreme Court review. See 489 U.S. at 195 n.2.
85. See Daniel Farber & John Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppe" Contract Law and the
"Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 945 (1985) ("We have proposed as a new standard
for enforcement that all promises made in furtherance of economic activities be enforced without
regard to the presence of consideration or reliance.").
86. See CHARLES FRIED, CoNTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TION 1 (1981) (arguing that contract law is based on the moral obligation arising out of a promise).
87. Widespread reliance on government agencies means that when agencies fail to act the re-
sulting harm can be just as serious as the harm caused by what was formerly labeled abusive govern-
ment action. See Jerry Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officer= Property Rights and Official
Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1978, at 8, 11 (discussing potential for serious
injury from government inaction). Another way to approach DeShaney might be to ask whether the
state action requirement was satisfied, i.e., whether Joshua's injuries were the result of state action.
Supporters of the Court's result might argue that Joshua's injuries were caused by private, not state,
action and that the fourteenth amendment regulates the latter and not the former. In an earlier day,
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Thus, the moral claim to protection from the state draws its strength
from several sources. Both the potential outrageousness of government
failure to protect known, helpless victims as well as the serious injuries
that can occur as a result make the government failure to prevent private
violence an injury that the due process clause and section 1983 should
remedy. Even absent specific promises, government's presence and role
in contemporary society creates a norm that makes it inexcusable for
government to stand by while helpless victims are injured.
III. LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND ADMINISTRATIVE FAILURE
At least one more base must be touched before the argument against
DeShaney is complete. Even if the arguments in favor of an ethical duty
to intervene are persuasive, I still must make the case that federal civil
rights litigation is the appropriate method to attack the administrative
failure in DeShaney. This argument must rebut the idea that, for reasons
that involve democracy and local accountability, any corrective action is
best left to the local political community and the local courts. After all,
if there is a widespread consensus that the government should act, then
the local political process will ensure correction and undemocratic fed-
eral judicial intervention is unnecessary and contrary to the contours of
the local political consensus.
The argument that federal judicial intervention is appropriate to
provide a remedy for the type of administrative failure in DeShaney and
Logan builds on the ethical and historical arguments. In this Part, the
focus turns to the forms of administrative failure, their causes, and the
when the state action requirement was attacked as the primary impediment to legal elimination of
private racism, arguments were made that would point toward a finding of state action in a case such
as DeShaney-for example, Randy DeShaney's ability to beat his son was enhanced by state action
and policy. See Charles Black, Foreword. "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's Proposl.
tion 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 70, 108 (1967). Just as a state, by failing to pass and enforce a fair
housing law, might lend its support to large-scale housing discrimination, so too the state, by grant-
ing custody over minor children to abusing parents, and failing to take adequate steps to protect
those children, lends the protection of law to the abuse. See idL at 93-94 (citing Harold Horowitz,
The Misleading Search for "State Action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV.
208, 218 (1957)).
Although the current Supreme Court would undoubtedly reject such a broad construction of
state action, I do not think that Morris Cohen's analysis in Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 8 (1927) has ever been answered: A restrictive state action doctrine does not adequately cap-
ture the involvement of the state in many instances of private discrimination or violence. See Theo.
dore St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection,
and "Prvate" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993, 1006, 1016 (1961) (powerful private
forces can impair the exercise of fourteenth amendment rights; private conduct condoned, but not
required by state law, should generally be considered state action). The Court's analysis should
focus on whether there should be state responsibility when injuries occur rather than the metaphysi-
cal inquiry of whether state action exists.
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relationship between administrative failure and the local political com-
munity. In addition to the argument that the fourteenth amendment
should prohibit injuries from administrative failure, this Part argues that
administrative failure may not be amenable to correction through local
democratic processes. Therefore, the federal courts could enhance de-
mocracy and protect against injuries by forcing local governments to cor-
rect administrative failures.
There are several steps to the argument that civil rights litigation
provides an appropriate vehicle for correcting local administrative fail-
ure. First, a discussion of the types of administrative failure and their
causes provides a background to the problem. Second, suggestions are
made concerning the appropriate judicial response to such failures. The
primary suggestion here is that the local political system might not pro-
vide adequate correction for reasons unrelated to the desires of the elec-
torate. Finally, a few questions concerning the section 1983 remedy are
addressed, including the potential problems with relying on state courts
for remedies.
A. Forms of Administrative Failure
To develop the argument that local administrative failure should be
remedied through civil rights actions, we must first understand the types
and causes of administrative failure; this, in turn, requires an understand-
ing of what constitutes proper administration. That is, we need to know
the legislative intent underlying the authorizing act and perhaps also the
intent behind the regulations in order to create a standard by which to
measure whether an agency succeeds or fails.
Administrative failure manifests itself in many forms and can result
in either overregulation or underregulation. Although DeShaney and the
general situation I consider involves failure to regulate adequately, in
many situations an agency could overregulate 8 Overregulation could be
caused by agents who desire more power or more security in their posi-
tion or by the influence of an interest group that will trade something of
value for benefits of more regulation. Although the analysis that follows
focuses primarily on underregulation, it is in no way intended to dispute
the potential for failure of the opposite form.
88. For example, in the Benzene Case if the Supreme Court were correct that Congress had
intended to address only significant health risks, and if there were no good reason to address less
serious risks, then the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) regulation limiting
benzene levels in the workplace environment to one part per million was an example of overregula-
tion. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (The
Benzene Case).
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Even though certain forms of agency failure, such as graft and
waste, may be easy to spot, it is far more difficult to decide whether other
forms of conduct amount to misconduct. The difficulty in deciding
whether an agency is meeting its mandate is best illustrated by the con-
troversial litigation often spawned by agency action.8 9 Each term the
Supreme Court's docket contains numerous cases in which parties argue
that a federal agency is violating its statutory mandate. 9o With different
interests competing for agency attention, one person's administrative fail-
ure may be another's success. 91
Because there are so many variables involved in determining
whether administrative failure exists, it is impossible to define it with any
precision.92 However, some rough generalizations concerning adminis-
trative failure will aid in the inquiry. In any large organization, the in-
centives of the various actors may differ, and monitoring costs may make
it either difficult or impossible for the legislature, executive or agency
89. See, eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,413 (1971) (agency
action must be set aside if it is capricious); The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 607 (decision exploring the
rationale of an agency determination to reduce the permissible exposure limits to carcinogens).
90. For example, during the October 1989 Term, the Court decided several cases regarding the
propriety of agency action, including Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (invalidating Social
Security regulations requiring child claimant to match disability with a listed disability as inconsis-
tent with Social Security Act's "comparable severity" language); Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S. Ct. 960
(1990) (upholding netting regulations as consistent with Social Security Act); Dole v. United Steel-
workers of America, 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990) (holding that the Paperwork Reduction Act does not
grant the Office of Management and Budget authority to review agency rules mandating disclosure
to third parties). The difficulty of defining bureaucratic failure is further illustrated by the scholarly
commentary. For example, Morris Fiorina defines bureaucratic failure as occurring when "an ideo-
logically mixed bag of observers consensually reject or condemn a bureaucratic rule, practice, deci-
sion, or other behavior when the latter is described in the abstract." Morris Fiorina, Flagellating the
Federal Bureaucracy, in THE PoLITcAL ECONOMY, supra note 50, at 224, 227. The most immedi-
ate weakness in Fiorina's definition is that it does not assume that the same group of observers
agreed with the agency's statutory mandate.
91. Fiorina raises the example of a program that might operate contrary to the general intent of
the legislature, but consistent with the desires of the small number of legislators with a strong inter-
est in the program. See Fiorina, supra note 90, at 228. Similarly, a program that could operate in
the general public interest might not do so because of capture by the regulated industry. Lobbying
generally is likely to be done by a small group of intensely interested parties; that lobbying might be,
as Downs argues, biased toward production activities (the producing industry) and not consumption
(consumers). See Downs, supra note 50, at 23.
92. Both Logan and DeShaney appear to present relatively clear cases of administrative failure:
The agency in Logan failed to provide even a hearing to determine whether discrimination had
occurred, and the agency in DeShaney failed to prevent child abuse despite glaring evidence of abuse.
But even in these cases the existence of failure was not clear to many of the judges that heard the
cases. In Logan, the Supreme Court of Illinois held unanimously that the state legislature intended
that mandatory proceedings should halt under the circumstances. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair
Employment Practices Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 99, 411 N.E.2d 277 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In DeShaney, the Supreme Court of the United States
hinted that the social worker may have made the right decision by avoiding a violation of the sanc-
tity of the DeShaney family. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
THE POLITICS OF DESHANEY
head to ensure proper conduct. 93 As noted above, graft is the easiest
form of administrative failure to identify. Slightly more difficult to iden-
tify is waste, in the form of resources that are used either for the personal
benefit of the agent or for no good reason at all. Although neither the
opinions nor the record in either case indicate why the administrative
failure occurred, DeShaney and Logan appear to fall into another cate-
gory of administrative failure-a failure due to laziness, incompetence, or
overwork.94 In Logan, the Court considered it irrelevant whether the
agent failed to convene a timely heaing purposely or inadvertently. In
DeShaney, the Court gives no explanation for why the social worker took
no further steps even with the clear evidence of continued abuse and the
difficulty the social workers experienced in trying to see Joshua. It may
be that the administrators were lazy, thus trying to minimize their work-
loads at taxpayer expense, in a fashion contrary to legislative intent. It
may be that they were incompetent or overworked, and in spite of their
good faith efforts, the social workers could not fulfill their statutory man-
dates. Further, it may be difficult to decide whether the failure is consis-
tent with or contrary to legislative intent: Although stated regulatory
goals were not met, funding decisions by the same legislature might have
made it impossible to hire qualified administrators or to hire enough ad-
ministrators to function competently.
Other forms of regulatory failure relate more closely to the tradi-
tional questions in administrative law. Administrators might, for a vari-
ety of reasons, develop regulatory goals different from those set forth by
the legislature. Legislative oversight by a narrow group of interested leg-
islators might lead agencies away from the general legislative intent.95
Agencies might be influenced by the lobbying of a narrow group of inter-
ested parties whose views do not represent the electorate or even the en-
acting legislature.96 And agencies might develop their own substantive
93. See Fiorina, supra note 90, at 230. At the federal level, where such things have been stud-
ied, the lack of effective oversight has been decried as a major failure regarding the administrative
state. See Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 165-66, 176 (1984). The authors distinguish
between "police patrol" oversight, in which the legislature constantly monitors administrative activ-
ity and "fire alarm" oversight, in which the legislature waits for interested parties to sound alarms.
The authors conclude that the latter method is most often employed by Congress because it works
better and is less expensive.
94. Social service agencies are notoriously overworked. See Martha Brannigan, In a State Aid
Agency, Overwhelmed Staffers Fight a Losing Battle, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
95. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
96. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. Sci.
3 (1971).
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views or be influenced by executive branch views contrary to the legisla-
tive intent.97
The pathologies of regulatory failure reveal why judicial interven-
tion might be part of the cure. Some argue that the most appropriate
conditions for judicial review occur when political failures make it un-
likely that the results of the political process reflect the will of the electo-
rate.98 Under these conditions, democratic processes will be of no avail
in correcting the failure. In such situations, judicial supervision can in-
crease accountability, and therefore the democratic control of govern-
ment with regard to administrative activity.
Take first the possibility that the agents are overworked because the
agency has inadequate funds to carry out its mission. As revealed by
subsequent litigation,99 this may have occurred in Logan, and a heavy
caseload could easily have contributed to the failure in DeShaney. Infor-
mation about funding levels may not come across to the electorate clearly
enough to influence elections.10 Moreover, incumbents possess an ad-
97. The controversy over Executive Order 12,291, promulgated in 1981 by President Reagan,
illustrates the problems that presidential involvement with regulation presents. See 3 C.F.R. 127
(1982). The Executive Order gave the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the authority to
review regulations proposed by various agencies to ensure that the regulations took costs and benefits
into account. The President's authority to command that cost-benefit analysis be part of the regula-
tory process and to require agencies to submit regulations to OMB for review was controversial from
the start. See Erik Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power Office of Management & Budget Supervision of
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT.
REsouRcEs L. 1 (1984). Olson's article provides useful citations on the OMB review controversy.
See id at 3 n.3; see also Symposium on Administrative Law "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the
Administrative Agencie.s " 36 AM. U.L. REv. 277 (1987). Another problem with executive oversight
is that a new President may want to change enforcement of a preexisting statute. This problem came
to a head in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
(Secretary of Transportation, in rescinding rule requiring passive restraints in passenger cars, failed
to adequately justify her decision).
98. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JoHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND Disausr 183 (1980).
99. See Bennett v. Tucker, 634 F. Supp 355 (N.D. Il1. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1987)
(class action alleging that 2500 people lost their employment discrimination claims because of ad-
ministrative processing failure).
100. A comparable argument has been made in support of the Court's distinction between proce-
dure and substance in due process cases. In those cases, the Court looks only to the substantive
features of a statute to determine whether due process requires some sort of a hearing; it ignores
statutory sections stating that little or no process attaches. Stewart and Sunstein state that one
justification for this, albeit one that they find weak, is that the electorate may not know about the
procedural limitations (which Stewart and Sunstein call "surreptitious sabotage") on a substantive
program they may favor. Thus, officials might tout a statutory entitlement that, in fact, provides
little real gain. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1258-59. I disagree with their assessment
of the weakness of this argument. They think that separation of powers principles stand against
courts imposing their own ideas of political responsibility. But the separation of powers principles
are largely judge-made, and the courts might not be as sympathetic to such arguments when political
accountability is at stake. To me, the positive role courts can play here in improving the functioning
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vantage because they have greater access to information with regard to
the operation of agencies.10 1 Incumbents may use the substantive con-
tours of a regulatory program for political advantage: For example, they
may take credit for a popular program such as an employment discrimi-
nation law or child welfare statute. But incumbents are unlikely to an-
nounce that the agency is not fulfilling its function due to inadequate
resources, and they may attempt to shift the blame for any failures to
others, such as the administrators or political opponents.102
Politicians persuade members of the political community to support
them, in part, by showing that their political beliefs and histories place
them within the ideology and interests of the community. 03 Insofar as
politicians can use the electorate's lack of information to their advantage,
the results of the political system are distorted. Further, administrative
failures may be so low on the political agenda that they will not even be
addressed in the electoral process. l04 If the beneficiaries of the regulation
tend to be weak and outside the political process, then the likelihood that
the political process will provide a remedy for the failure is reduced even
more.
The agent or agency pursuing goals that are at odds with the legisla-
ture's intent amounts to another source of administrative failure-a fail-
ure of the political system. If the legislation itself reflects the will of the
political community (an admittedly controversial assumption),10 5 then
any deviation from the intent of the legislature should be condemned as
undemocratic. Deviation from legislative goals can occur in a number of
of the political system and helping victims such as Joshua outweighs any interests elected officials
have in preserving the weaknesses in accountability that have been identified.
101. See Downs, supra note 50, at 141. In general, imperfect information allows incumbents to
maximize credit-claiming and minimize responsibility for failures. See Morris Fiorina, Legislative
Choice or Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PuB. CHoicE 33, 48-49
(1982). The news about inadequate funding may be suppressed while the good points of the program
are trumpeted.
Sometimes the disjunction between policy and funding will not go unnoticed. For example,
President George Bush recently spoke out strongly in favor of care for victims of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). His critics pointed out that "Mr. Bush had removed from his budget
crucial money for AIDS drugs and all of the money for demonstration projects on home and com-
munity care." Phillip Hilts, Bush in First Address on AIDS, Backs a Bill to Protect Its Victims, N. Y.
Times, Mar. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
102. Morris Fiorina has argued that the idea behind setting up an administrative agency with
discretion might partly be to allow lawmakers to shift blame for failures to the agency. See Fiorina,
supra note 90, at 46-54.
103. See Downs, supra note 50, at 16-17.
104. See Note, supra note 67, at 639. The note as a whole makes a well-documented argument
in favor of judicial review, under the Administrative Procedure Act, of agency inaction in the form
of failure to implement statutes. The note rejects justiciability limits that have been raised as argu-
ments against such review. See id at 645-61.
105. See generally THEDoRE LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALIsM 57-61 (2d ed. 1979).
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fashions. Oversight activities are likely to be dominated by a small group
of intensely interested lawmakers whose interests may or may not reflect
the views that led to the passage of the legislation.10 6 Lobbying by regu-
lated parties may overwhelm the voices of those who lack a great individ-
ual stake in the regulation, and collective action problems may prevent a
strong response.10 7 Additionally, unelected agents are shielded from di-
rect political scrutiny. Thus, given the difficulty of effective oversight, 10 8
agency actions may not be brought into line with legislatively stated
goals. Again, information is unlikely to be widely disseminated because
those with the information may not have a strong incentive to make it
public.
One also could attribute agency failure to a misalignment of the in-
centives of agents with agency goals.109 Because of the realities of gov-
ernment bureaucracies, 110 government agencies cannot easily monitor
individual agent's behavior for fidelity to regulatory goals. Agents may
simply shirk their responsibilities and minimize the amount of work they
do. Although many agents are drawn to their jobs by a commitment to
the work of the agency, this is not universally true; and even the most
dedicated agents may be adversely affected by the lack of incentives to
perform well. My general intuition is that as the local political commu-
nity becomes less integrated, and the bureaucrat becomes more alienated
from the population that depends on the agency, the lack of direct incen-
tives to perform becomes an increasing problem.' If the social worker
in DeShaney and the hearing officer in Logan had no significant personal
incentives to perform properly, one should not be surprised that they
failed.
106. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 93, at 172, 174-75. Oversight also may be ineffec-
tive because legislators may lack time to address every administrative failing, especially if the issue is
not one of general political interest. See Note, supra note 67, at 639-40. The note argues these same
types of factors also may explain why the President cannot effectively oversee agency inaction. See
id. at 641-42.
107. See Downs, supra note 50, at 23-24. Downs argues that economic factors make lobbying
and "government submission to the demands of lobbyists" perfectly rational because lobbyists con-
trol resources that politicians need for continued political support and reelection.
108. In fact, civil rights suits can be characterized as a form of "fire alarm" oversight. See supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
109. See Fiorina, supra note 90, at 227.
110. Government agencies operate under political pressures which may make it impossible to
optimize size and monitoring capabilities the way that private firms might be able to do. See Ronald
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 394-95 (1937) (arguing that firms grow
only to the point that the gains from growth outweigh the losses from inability to monitor perform-
ance of employees).
111. More specifically, my intuition is that as the local community becomes larger and more
diverse---and a professional, political, and bureaucratic class develops-the likelihood that govern-
ment policy will mirror the desire of the community decreases. For discussions of this sort of prob-
lem on the national level, see T. Lowi, supra note 105, at 212-24; Downs, supra note 50, at 148-49.
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In all of these situations, judicial scrutiny of the administrative fail-
ure will increase the ability of the local political community to control
government action. The operative assumption here is that the political
community is less likely to receive and appreciate information about ad-
ministrative failure than information about the substantive requirements
of state law. Judicial scrutiny would prevent incumbents from trumpet-
ing a program on the one hand and not funding it on the other because
courts would be able to grant a remedy to those injured by the failure to
fulfill regulatory goals. This remedy is what the Supreme Court's Logan
decision imposed upon Illinois. Politicians, thus, could not take advan-
tage of the community's lack of information because courts would inter-
vene and remedy those failures that cause injuries to protected
interests.112
In cases that involve administrative failures in which the agencies
purposely fail to carry out statutory goals, judicial scrutiny could bring
administrative action in line with legislative goals. 11 3 Lawsuits can func-
tion like fire alarms, alerting the political community to the existence of
administrative failure and creating incentives through damage awards
(and injunctive relief) for agencies to conform their conduct to the
law. '1 4 Further, the use of court actions as oversight would enhance con-
trol over agencies by the elected officials who are more directly accounta-
ble to the electorate. Agents would have to analyze the costs of potential
damages that they might incur for their failure to act in consonance with
regulatory goals. 115
112. The disjunction between funding and substance raises the difficult issue of federal court
power to order expenditure of funds to bring local programs into compliance with the Constitution.
Although the Court has ordered states to spend money to comply with the Constitution, see Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1977), and has rejected lack of funds as a defense to a constitu-
tional claim, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-26 (1977), federal court power to order appro-
priation of funds sufficient to operate a local agency effectively is uncertain. My analysis, however,
favors judicial exercise of such power. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (federal court
may require a local government to levy taxes in excess of state statutory limits so as to fund a school
desegregation plan); cf Spailone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 631, 634 (1990) (contempt orders
against city council members for failing to enact affordable housing ordinance held improper, district
court should have proceeded first against city alone; certiorari on propriety of order requiring city to
enact affordable housing ordinance was denied).
113. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1282-83 (judicial intervention to require initiation
of regulation may increase faithfulness to statutory directives).
114. See ia at 1278 (private rights to initiate suit can fill the gap between electoral responsibility
and bureaucratic regulation). Stewart and Sunstein do not address, in their discussion of private
rights of initiation, the possibility of damages directly against the agency or agent, but their analysis
is largely applicable to both issues so long as both types of action have the same effect on administra-
tive action. They do include, in their discussion of private rights of action, the possibility of damage
actions against administrators, but they do not explore this issue in detail. See aL at 1289-1315.
115. An unstated assumption here is that judges have an incentive to use their power of review to
enforce legislative goals and not their own goals. This assumption may not be accurate, and this
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Some regulatory failure can be corrected through the political pro-
cess. Large-scale failure that affects interests of those who possess the
resources and ability to lobby is unproblematic; this group may respond
loudly and persuasively when agency action or inaction affects their in-
terests. In cases like Logan and DeShaney, however, which involve rela-
tively weak and insular victims, a lobbying effort is less likely to be
sufficient to move administrators to remedy the failure. Thus, one justifi-
cation for finding a due process violation when state regulation fails and
injury to protected interests occurs is that defects in the political process
make it unlikely that the local political community can act to correct the
failures. By viewing regulatory programs as promises to the benefi-
ciaries, the courts can force the government to guarantee their promises
and thus correct for administrative failure.
B. The Civil Rights Connection
Once we establish a governmental duty to act, the final question is
whether a section 1983 civil rights suit is the appropriate avenue to en-
force this duty. Section 1983 is the primary device by which parties
bring their constitutional claims against state officials into federal court.
Because section 1983 is part of a statute denominated "An Act to En-
force the Fourteenth Amendment" many of the arguments for a section
1983 remedy are the same as the due process arguments and do not need
repeating. In this Section, I highlight a few of the reasons why the civil
rights remedy is appropriate to combat unconstitutional failures to inter-
vene against private misconduct-especially when that misconduct in-
jures a powerless member of society.
A major theme that the Court emphasizes with regard to the appro-
priate scope of section 1983 is the statute's role in placing the federal
courts between the citizen and the state in order to protect the citizen
from injuries.' 16 The injuries caused by state official conduct that courts
recognize as compensable section 1983 injuries-bodily injury and other
common law injuries-are the same sort of injuries that occurred in
DeShaney. 117 Further, the language, legislative history, and historical
possibility presents a serious problem for any theory that depends on judicial action. I intend to
address the question of judicial incentives in a future article. See Jack Beermann, Interest Group
Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice (unpublished manuscript 1990) (available
from author).
116. See eg., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 492, 503-05 (1982) (purpose ofsection 1983 to
protect federal civil rights by interposing federal courts between the individual and the state);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180-83 (1961) (section 1983 enacted to prevent state agencies from
denying citizens the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
117. See Carey v. Piphus, 457 U.S. 247 (1978). For a close parallel to DeShaney, see Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (prison guard liable for punitive damages under section 1983 for recklessly
1108 [VCol. 1990:1078
Vol. 1990:1078] THE POLITICS OF DESHANEY 1109
context of section 1983 favor an application of the statute that remedies
the "states' failure to protect the individual's constitutional rights." 11
Professor Soifer also has argued that the post-Civil War amendments
were designed to impose upon states-sovereignty interests notwith-
standing-duties to protect people from private violence in some situa-
tions.11 9 This history may not be very specific, but the test for propriety
in constitutional law is not whether the Framers would have given the
same answer as the Court. 120 Rather, history provides guidance, sup-
port, and an answer to critics who demand historical footing for constitu-
tional development. The potential for injury due to government failure
to act is as great or greater than at the time when section 1983 was en-
acted. Therefore, the section 1983 remedy should be available in situa-
tions such as DeShaney.
Basic premises underlying an expansive view of section 1983 militate
in favor of its application to remedy failures to protect. Section 1983 and
its jurisdictional counterpart 121 grant a federal remedy to victims of state
violations of federal rights in order to allow the plaintiff to choose a fo-
rum that is less likely to be biased in favor of state interests and against
federal rights. For a variety of reasons, the local courts may not provide
sufficient redress for the injuries in situations in which local government
fails to act.122 State law often discriminates against claimants who seek
damages against government officials for tortious conduct. For example,
although Wisconsin tort law liberally imposes liability for public 123 and
private' 24 torts in situations such as DeShaney, it also sets limits on dam-
disregarding the federally protected civil rights of an inmate by placing him, while under protective
custody, in a cell with other inmates with a proclivity for fighting).
118. E. Keynes, supra note 26, at app. 23.
119. See Soifer, supra note 26, at 686-87, 700.
120. For example, with respect to the fourteenth amendment the Court has ignored the specific
views of the Framers of the amendment. See eg., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
122. Another potential problem with a section 1983 remedy here is immunity under the eleventh
amendment. While local government units have not been granted eleventh amendment immunity,
see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 & n.55 (1978), states and state
officials enjoy broad immunity against damage actions in federal court. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974). The debate about the proper scope of the eleventh amendment and sovereign im-
munity is ongoing, and I do not wish to enter it here except to state that I agree with the critics who
argue that the eleventh amendment should not bar federal claims. See Beermann, Official Torts
supra note 7, at 336-40 (discussing and citing literature and recent cases concerning eleventh amend-
ment and state sovereign immunity).
123. See Wood v. Milin, 134 Wis. 2d 279, 397 N.W.2d 479 (1986) (holding building inspector
liable for failing to inspect building that later collapsed).
124. See Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988). In Schuster, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist could be held liable for failing to warn a patient's
family about the patient's potentially dangerous condition. The court rejected the argument that no
duty to warn existed when no identifiable victim existed. It held that the general principles of Wis-
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ages recoverable against government that frequently are too low to pro-
vide adequate compensation.12 5 The lack of adequate damage remedies
for state tort victims should be a cause for federal concern.12 6
The common-law-like section 1983 remedy 2 7 also can help create
incentives for agents and agencies to perform their jobs properly. Section
1983 helps both to ensure that state law conforms to the United States
Constitution and to keep state officials under control when their conduct
violates both state and federal law. As discussed above,128 the incentives
that prompt state officials to act may not be consistent with state regula-
tory goals or federal constitutional principles. When section 1983 reme-
dies tend to encourage compliance with those norms, the remedies
accomplish their purpose.
Of course, the incentives may go too far. The limits on the state's
duty to intervene, as imposed under section 1983, are not altogether
clear. As the duty to intervene becomes stronger, the objections to inter-
vention based on local political autonomy become greater. For example,
consin tort law permit a finding of negligence liability whenever an "act or omission to act could
cause harm to someone." Id at 232, 424 N.W.2d at 163. The limit on such liability is apparently
foreseeability. The court explicitly recognized that its tort doctrines might create "an affirmative
duty to act." Id at 238, 424 N.W.2d at 165. But see Winslow v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 327, 371
N.W.2d 417 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (passengers in automobile had no duty to prevent driver from
driving on bicycle path even though driver's actions were clearly dangerous to users of path).
125. See supra note 80.
126. I have elsewhere developed a lengthy argument that government failure to provide compen-
sation for its torts should be held unconstitutional. See Beermann, Official Torts, supra note 7. The
main thrust of the argument is that government should not be allowed to externalize randomly the
costs of its operation, and that the best measure of the costs of the operation of government is the
rules that govern private liability. Therefore, government should be liable whenever a private party
would be liable.
127. By the use of the term "common-law-like" I refer to two distinct attributes of the section
1983 remedy. First, the Court often refers to section 1983 as a species of tort liability. See, eg.,
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (Court observes that rules developed in tort law defining
damages and recovery provide the foundation for inquiries under section 1983); Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (Court noted that section 1983 had its origins in section I of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, which sought to create a form of tort liability for federally protected
rights. Utilizing this information the Court looked to the common law of torts to arrive at the
purposes and policies of section 1983.). Recently, this reference has signaled the Court's unwilling-
ness to expand section 1983 damages beyond injuries that were compensable at common law. See
Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); see also SheldQn Nahmod,
Section 1983 Discourse The Move from Constitution to Tort 77 GEo. L.. 1719, 1720 (1989) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court's "tort" references in section 1983 cases are meant to "make it less
protective of fourteenth amendment rights"). Second, because of its general terms, the Court's rea-
soning about the proper scope of the section 1983 remedy resembles common law reasoning in the
way that policy, principle, and statutory authority are taken into account. See RicHARD POSNER,
THE FEDERAL CouRiS: CRISIS AND REFrORM 300-01 (1985); William Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987). See generally Beermann, Section 1983, supra note
38, at 76-84.
128. See supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
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one powerful argument against an enforceable claim against local gov-
ernment to minimum food and shelter is that the local political commu-
nity should be free to allocate resources, because the local community
can better comprehend local needs. But the more specific the duty be-
comes, the more reliance people may place on the promises contained in
state regulatory programs. If federal courts were to recognize this reli-
ance interest, then states would have an incentive to give up programs,
rather than face the possibility of liability. Whether this abandonment
would materialize depends, at least in part, on the strength of the polit-
ical community's commitment to provide the services.
In sum, once the forms and causes of administrative failure are un-
derstood, the case for judicial intervention becomes much stronger. Peo-
ple have grown to depend on administrative action, and the consequences
of failure to act are often just as serious as errant action. Further, judi-
cial intervention can enhance the political system's accountability for the
conduct of administrative officials.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay has been to explore the normative under-
pinnings of a constitutional theory that assigns government, in some cir-
cumstances, the duty to protect members of society from private
violence. The constitutional obligation of government to protect the
weak in society should be recognized regardless of government's previous
promises or actions. This argument is constructed from the current
structure of our society and from the moral landscape of increased social
attention to the needs of the powerless. Joshua DeShaney and other
powerless victims of private violence should be the beneficiaries of the
fourteenth amendment; victims should be able to hold the state responsi-
ble for failing to protect them. State failure to act to protect these peo-
ple--especially when state agents know of the plight of the victims--
meets any definition of "outrageousness" formulated by the Supreme
Court as a due process test.
The existence of state agencies designed to attack private miscon-
duct strengthens the argument for intervention. The state makes statu-
tory promises to protect the weak; by failing to treat its tort victims the
same as victims of torts inflicted by non-governmental actors, the state
violates the guarantees of due process. Because of the victim's weakness,
and because state agencies may have displaced other sources of relief, the
victims often have nowhere else to seek aid. Thus, states should be
forced to live up to their promises of help against private misconduct.
Further, judicial intervention that remedies state failures to act-
failures that contribute to harm to protected interests-can help our
1111Vol. 1990:1078]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
political community realize three separate sets of ideals. First, judicial
intervention is consistent with the moral commitment to protection from
private misconduct and the dangers of life-a commitment that explains
much of the activity of contemporary government. Second, by keeping
local administrators accountable to the electorate, the ideals of democ-
racy will be advanced. Finally, broad application of the fourteenth
amendment and the section 1983 remedy can help ensure state govern-
ment and official accountability.
There are two related problems with imposing positive duties on
government: the lack of boundaries and the displacement of local
choices. On the first point, I do not see more uncertainty here than in
many nascent areas of law, and there is nothing inherent in the recogni-
tion of positive constitutional rights that makes development of doctrinal
limits more difficult than usual. Courts, operating on a case-by-case ba-
sis, should be able to identify compelling cases for judicial intervention.
If after a period of concerted effort, this approach proves unsuccessful,
reconsideration might be in order. 129 On the second point, I am not con-
vinced that there is a democratically chosen position that would be frus-
trated by judicial intervention. Often, injuries occur because government
officials neglect their legal duties, or work to subvert rather than advance
legislative purposes. Judicial intervention can increase, rather than de-
grade, political control and accountability.
In sum, the rhetoric and social vision of the world of negative rights
is out of place in today's society. It makes little sense to decry positive
rights in the welfare state, especially once the pervasive role of govern-
ment in shaping society is recognized. It would be much more produc-
tive if the discussion were redirected toward exploring the contours of
society's responsibilities toward the unfortunate and the ways in which
social choices create the conditions for administrative failure and in-
crease the consequences of such failure. Even if the Court, pursuing this
line of reasoning, were to come out against a duty to protect, this would
be an advance over the current jurisprudence-a jurisprudence that re-
fuses to acknowledge the role of government within the structure of our
society.
129. In the past, the Supreme Court has proved willing to change directions when an approach
has proved unsuccessful. For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985), the Court overruled the amorphous constitutional standard set forth in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Garcia, the Court recognized that the National League of
Cities standard was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
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